

- Rowley, Charles, *The Destruction of Aboriginal Society* (Canberra, 1970).
 Salmond, Anne, *Two Worlds: First Meetings Between Maori and Europeans 1642–1772* (Auckland, 1991).
 Sharp, Andrew, *Justice and the Maori: Maori Claims in New Zealand Political Argument in the 1980s* (Auckland, 1990).
 Sinclair, Keith, *The Origins of the Maori Wars* (Wellington, 1957).
 Sorrenson, M. P. K., *Maori Origins and Migrations: The Genesis of Some Pakeha Myths and Legends* (Auckland, 1979).
 Tau, Te Maire, *Nga Pikituroa o Ngai Tahu: The Oral Traditions of Ngai Tahu* (Dunedin, 2003).
 Ward, Alan, *A Show of Justice: Racial 'Amalgamation' in Nineteenth-Century New Zealand* (Auckland, 1974).

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Attwood, Bain, *Telling the Truth About Aboriginal History* (Sydney, 2005).
 —and Magowan, Fiona (eds.), *Telling Stories: Indigenous History and Memory in Australia and New Zealand* (Sydney/Wellington, 2001).
 Neumann, Klaus, Thomas, Nicholas, and Ericksen, Hilary (eds.), *Quicksands: Foundational Histories in Australia and Aoteroa New Zealand* (Sydney, 1999).
 Sharp, Andrew and McHugh, Paul (eds.), *Histories, Power and Loss: Uses of the Past—A New Zealand Commentary* (Wellington, 2001).

Chapter 30

Chinese Historical Writing since 1949

Susanne Weigelin-Schwiedrzik

Chinese historiography is divided into two political camps, and since 1949 located in two political entities which both claim to represent China as a whole: the People's Republic of China (PRC) with its capital in Beijing, and the Republic of China (ROC) with its capital in Nanjing and its headquarters in Taipei. This fundamental divide was part and parcel of the Cold War, and dominated the field until the late 1970s when the Communist Party of China (CCP) decided to embark on a road of reform and opening, and the Guomindang (GMD) decided in favour of gradual democratization and the abolishment of martial law in Taiwan. Since then, historiography in mainland China as well as in Taiwan has been undergoing major changes, and these changes seem to drive the two republics further apart. Until the late 1970s, historians on both sides of the Taiwan Strait were focused on Chinese history, and the fundamental problems they confronted were very much the same despite the ideological and political hostility that separated the two camps. Since the end of the Cold War, however, different agendas have been pursued: those in the mainland are confronted with the necessity of rewriting the history of China since the last dynasty to adjust historical interpretation to the necessity of change in the present, and those in Taiwan are in the course of establishing a history of Taiwan that can serve as an argument in favour of the island's independence from mainland China. Historians on both sides of the strait are in search of a new master narrative. This is what unites them on an abstract level; what separates them is that they are in search of master narratives for two different nations.

COMMON ISSUES OF WRITING HISTORY IN
MAINLAND CHINA AND TAIWAN

The common questions historians in mainland China and Taiwan have to solve are those they inherited from the Republican era and the more remote past. The art of history-writing is part of the process of nation-building which China has been pursuing since the collapse of the empire. From that moment on, Chinese

historiography has had to participate in defining China's new role as a nation among nations, and thus China's position in the world. The focus of this debate has been the question of particularity versus universality in Chinese history. Even as historiography in mainland China was going through a period of cooperation with the countries in the socialist camp under the leadership of the Soviet Union, and historians in Taiwan were drawn into historiographical debates in the Western part of the world under US leadership, the question of whether or not Chinese history could be analyzed in terms compatible with European history remained debated. This is true, although in both cases the writing of history was strictly controlled by the respective governmental authorities. Nevertheless, it was much more diverse than outside observers would assume. Historians not only used the past to criticize the present, but also developed a field of professionalism defining the rules of the profession and the degree of autonomy it could claim. It is in this context that they discussed the relationship between historical theory and historical data, be it in the form of relating Marxism-Leninism or Western social theories to Chinese history.¹

With the death of Chiang Kai-shek and Mao Zedong the region entered the post-Cold War period earlier than the rest of the world and, as a consequence, historiography has been confronted with new challenges. As historiography was closely linked to the politics of the Cold War era it has had to re-establish its legitimacy and regain public confidence. While academic historiography is threatened by marginalization, popular interest in history is growing. The recent past plays a major role in this context, and the rewriting of contemporary history is the main challenge with which historians in mainland China as well as in Taiwan are confronted. This history is still in the making, and the writing of contemporary history is embedded into a process of social diversification, individualization, and commodification, in which academic history-writing has to learn to cope with a new diversity stemming from hitherto unknown forms of historiography, such as cartoons and films or computer games and weblogs. While the fragmentation and specialization of the field is rapidly occurring, the public demand for unity in history is more and more difficult to meet.

The institutionalization of historiography is another aspect that shows less difference between mainland China and Taiwan than most would expect. Already before 1949, academic life in China had been organized around two core institutions: the universities and their respective faculties on the one hand, and the Academia Sinica system with its specialized research institutes on the other. This system moved to Taiwan with the GMD government,² and was

¹ See Susanne Weigelin-Schwiedrzik, 'On "shi" and "lun": Towards a Typology of Historiography in the PRC', *History and Theory*, 35:4 (1996), 74–97; and Q. Edward Wang, 'Taiwan's Search for National History: A Trend in Historiography', *East Asian History*, 24 (2002), 93–116.

² Du Zhengsheng and Wang Fansen (eds.), *Xin shixue zhi lu: Zhongyang yanjiuyuan lishi yuyan yanjiusuo qi shi zhounian jinian wenji*, 2 vols. (Taipei, 1998).

reduplicated by the People's Republic of China, as it was common to all countries under Soviet influence. The scholars who took over leadership positions in the late 1940s belonged to the so-called May Fourth generation, with Hu Shi and Fu Sinian dominating the field of historiography on Taiwan, and Guo Moruo as well as Fan Wenlan acting as the directors of the Institute of Ancient History and the Institute of Modern History of the Academy of Science (today the Academy of Social Sciences) in Beijing respectively.³ However, while most of the infrastructure, both in terms of hardware and software, had to be rebuilt in Taiwan, the newly established communist regime in mainland China had to define a strategy of coping with the opposite problem. The majority of historians remained on the mainland. They were not ready or willing to build their research on Marxism-Leninism. That is why on both sides of the strait a form of historiography that was oriented towards the compilation of sources, and interested in historical facts rather than theories, dominated the field until the late 1950s when this traditional form of history-writing met with criticism. Students in history departments asked vehemently for historical interpretations and explanations, and thus helped a new generation of historians to take over the field. They introduced the idea of social history, and argued in favour of using social theories as a basis of historical interpretation. In mainland China, this new generation was trained 'under the red banner of Mao Zedong'; and in the case of Taiwan it was influenced by US scholarship.⁴

The turn towards theory generated a conflict with the idea of the particularity of history in China. It also generated criticism of an orientalist or colonialist view of Chinese history. As a response to this, both in mainland China and Taiwan the process of globalization is accompanied by an intensification of the search for particularity in history. For mainland China this implies remembering the greatness of the past as a basis for success in the future; for Taiwan this means defining the difference between the history of China and the history of Taiwan. Of course, these new trends in historiography meet with explicit and implicit resistance and have not yet grown to dominate the field. But they are likely to exert a major influence on the future development of historiography in China.

³ See Susanne Weigelin-Schwiedrzik, 'Back to the Past: Revisionism in Chinese Communist Historiography', in Mechthild Leutner (ed.), *Chinese History and Society, Berliner China-Hefte*, 31 (2006), 3–22; and Q. Edward Wang, 'Between Marxism and Nationalism: Chinese Historiography and the Soviet Influence, 1949–1963', *Journal of Contemporary China*, 9:23 (2000), 95–111.

⁴ See Susanne Weigelin-Schwiedrzik, 'History and Truth in Marxist Historiography', in Helwig Schmidt-Glintzer, Achim Mittag, and Jörn Rüsen (eds.), *Historical Truth, Historical Criticism and Ideology: Chinese Historiography and Historical Culture from a New Comparative Perspective* (Leiden, 2005), 421–64.

ESTABLISHING MARXIST DOMINANCE OVER
THE FIELD OF HISTORIOGRAPHY IN THE PRC
DURING THE 1950s

The master narrative which the CCP introduced to the field of history-writing in 1949 had been written in three steps. During the late 1920s, at a time when the CCP was still competing with the GMD for public influence, the discussion on the 'character of Chinese society' was used to convince leftist circles in China of the possibility of interpreting Chinese history in light of Marxism-Leninism. Guo Moruo played a major role in this context as he proved that China, like any other country in the world, had developed according to what was later canonized as the system of social development in five stages by Stalin.⁵ Guo Moruo became, from that time on, one of the most authoritative Marxist historians in China, which helps explain why he was later appointed director of the Institute of Ancient History at the Beijing Academy of Science. The second step took place during the Yan'an Rectification Campaign. In 'On the Chinese Revolution and the Chinese Communist Party' (1939),⁶ Mao had put down the main ideas later historians had to reiterate when writing a history of China since 1840. This text was a product of the sinification of Marxism-Leninism and widely studied among CCP cadres and intellectuals in Yan'an, the headquarters of the CCP during the Anti-Japanese War of 1937-45. Fan Wenlan was the first to incorporate Mao's ideas into a book on modern Chinese history.⁷ He would later become director of the Institute for Modern History at the Academy of Science. Additionally, the Yan'an Rectification Campaign dealt with the history of the CCP. The CCP Central Committee passed a 'Resolution on Some Questions of History' shortly before the seventh party congress in 1945 that was to serve as a directive to party historiography in post-1949 mainland China.⁸

According to this master narrative, China had gone through a period of early communism and slavery before entering the feudal stage upon the unification of the empire in 221 BC. China developed seeds of capitalism during the late imperial period, but because of the influence of imperialism they were unable to flower, and instead a semi-feudal and semi-colonial society developed during the nineteenth century. The Revolution of 1911 was read as an unsuccessful

⁵ Mechthild Leutner, *Geschichtsschreibung zwischen Politik und Wissenschaft: Zur Herausbildung der chinesischen marxistischen Geschichtswissenschaft in den 30er und 40er Jahren* (Wiesbaden, 1982); and Arif Dirlik, *Revolution and History: The Origins of Marxist Historiography in China, 1919-1937* (Berkeley, 1978).

⁶ Mao Zedong: 'On the Chinese Revolution and the Communist Party of China', in *Collected Works of Mao Zedong*, vol. 2 (Beijing, 1968), 305-34.

⁷ Fan Wenlan, *Zhongguo jindaishi* (1947; Beijing, 1955).

⁸ Mao Zedong, 'Resolution on Some Questions of History', in *Selected Works*, vol. 4 (New York, 1954-6), 171-85.

attempt to overthrow feudalism and establish a bourgeois republic. Therefore, the revolution had to be continued under the leadership of the Communist Party in order to achieve social justice and national independence. This revolution was successful because it combined 'the general principles of Marxism-Leninism with the concrete practice of the Chinese revolution' according to the official histories and Mao Zedong Thought.⁹ This implies that the CCP mobilized the peasants rather than the urban proletariat, and led a military fight in the countryside rather than a political battle in the cities. Upon victory, the CCP was to establish a 'new democracy' based on a coalition government between the representatives of the people (the CCP) and the representatives of the bourgeoisie, before entering the stage of socialism and then communism. Pre-modern Chinese history was to be the proof for the truth of Marxism-Leninism, as Mao Zedong Thought was at the same time the product of modern Chinese history and its innate truth. The writing of history was therefore closely linked to making the *Weltanschauung* of the newly established regime understandable as scientific in its relationship to the past, and visionary in its relationship to the future. It conveyed one message of central importance: the past was bad, and the present was good.

This master narrative was in many ways the very opposite of traditional Chinese historiography. It had a linear orientation as opposed to the cyclical cosmology so central to previous Chinese historiography. It revolutionized the present's relationship to the past: whereas in ancient times the past had always served as a positive example, now the present was superior. It integrated Chinese history into world history, thereby replacing the idea of China as 'everything under heaven' with the idea of China as a nation among nations. It claimed to be based on scientific reasoning and written for the masses, thereby surpassing the convention of writing history by bureaucrats for bureaucrats in accordance with the interests of the ruling elite. By showing that Marxism-Leninism was at the same time the product of history and the underlying principle of historical change, it created an hermetic system of historical knowledge in which facts served to prove the theory, and theory served as the criterion for presenting facts. The historian no longer had to study history in order to know the past: he knew the past before studying history.

When the CCP first took over mainland China it did not impose this master narrative on the historical profession, and it took quite some time for it to reach students in high schools and universities. Historians usually held their pre-1949 positions and learned step by step to comply with the presence of CCP party organizations in their respective institutions. However, the master narrative was an essential part of the educational programme which the CCP developed for its own cadres and the personnel from the former regime who had to be integrated

⁹ See Susanne Weigelin-Schwiedrzik, 'Party Historiography', in Jonathan Unger (ed.), *Using the Past to Serve the Present: Historiography and Politics in Contemporary China* (Armonk, 1993), 164-71.

into the CCP-led administration. Party history and the history of the revolution were the main topics of this programme, with the training of the trainers coming from the newly established 'People's University' and its department for Party history, under the leadership of Hu Hua.¹⁰

The first time the field of historical studies felt the power of the new regime was when the most prominent intellectual of the Republican era and most influential historian on Taiwan was criticized in a public campaign in 1953-4.¹¹ With many under his influence, historians were asked to make a clean break by criticizing Hu Shi for his belief in positivism and pragmatism. Simultaneously, historians were asked to revise their ideas about traditional Chinese historiography. The past should no longer be seen as a reservoir of knowledge accumulated for the purpose of solving problems in the present. The past was to be criticized and rejected as the basis of designing a new future. The revolution was the turning point in this scenario. It represented the rupture between past and present and between bad and good.

This campaign was a prelude to what was later to develop in the campaign against rightist elements. When the movement to 'let a hundred flowers blossom' was redirected by Mao Zedong into a campaign to 'criticize rightist elements' in 1957, historians were assessed according to the degree to which they had accepted Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought as guidance for their historical research. During this campaign, a set quota of university professors and intellectuals were expelled from their positions and replaced by a younger generation loyal to the Party and its *Weltanschauung*. The masses in universities, factories, and the newly established People's Communes wrote their own histories, 'white flags' (representing bourgeois experts) were replaced by 'red flags' (representing political enthusiasts), and Marxism-Leninism, as well as Mao Zedong Thought, were established as the unquestionable guidance.¹² This was aptly called 'the revolution of historiography'.

While thousands of professional historians had to leave their positions and undergo thought reform, the establishment of leftist historians who had shown support for the CCP before 1949 took over leading positions in the field. It did not take long, however, for some of them to criticize the 'dogmatism' that accompanied this takeover. In the course of this debate it became clear that there was a major rift cutting through Marxist historians in China, and that the master narrative the CCP had put together before its takeover was highly

¹⁰ See Weigelin-Schwiedrzik, 'Back to the Past'; and Wang, 'Between Marxism and Nationalism'.

¹¹ See Chan Lien, 'Communism versus Pragmatism: The Criticism of Hu Shi's Philosophy', *Journal of Asian Studies*, 27 (1968), 551-70.

¹² Mao Zedong, 'Zhunbei zuihou zainan', in Helmut Martin (ed.), *Texte, Schriften, Dokumente, Reden, Gespräche*, vol. 3. (Munich, 1977), 153 (for the German translation), 410-11 (for the Chinese text).

contested among professional historians, despite their unanimous Marxist orientation.

'China and Western Europe are two different places; both of them dispose of quite a number of particularities. But if we declare the particularity of Western European history to be universal, we lose whatever particularity there is in Chinese history.'¹³ Fan Wenlan, who voiced this criticism in 1957, argued against the style of history-writing developed by Guo Moruo and his Institute for Ancient History that sought to replace the traditional way of using the facts and anecdotes of the past to perpetuate the moral standards of the ruling elite with a set of so-called basic principles of Marxism-Leninism. It would only be the facts and anecdotes from Chinese history that could make these principles plausible that would then be integrated into the narrative on ancient Chinese history. Consequently, Chinese history was bestowed with a totally new and different content, and the esoteric ritual of referring to the past was replaced by the esoteric ritual of referring to Marxism-Leninism.

The criticism was voiced at a time when many Chinese intellectuals turned against the Soviet Union and the imposition of Soviet orthodoxy. That is why they connected the demand for particularity in history with the criticism of 'dogmatism' and the dominance of theory in historical research. Fan Wenlan, Jian Bozan, dean of the Faculty of History at the renowned Peking University, and Wu Han, a prominent historian and vice-mayor of Beijing, were among the most outspoken critics of Guo Moruo's dogmatism. They argued in favour of a form of historiography that was based on facts and refined by Marxist methodology. They believed that the particularity of Chinese history was embedded in the facts. That is why they wanted to reject the Soviet version of Marxism and rely instead on Marxism as a methodology that did not predetermine the outcome of historical research, but rather guided the search for meaning in the past by delineating what was particular about Chinese history. They summarized their method in slogans such as that 'interpretation should be derived from facts' (Wu Han) or that 'facts and theory should be combined' (Jian Bozan), and they condemned Guo Moruo's style as one where 'theory takes the lead over facts'.¹⁴

The Soviet scholarship that dominated historical writing in post-1949 China was never uncontested. However, during the early 1950s both Guo Moruo and Fan Wenlan had accepted the idea that China would follow the five-stages development model. At that time they used the orientation towards Soviet scholarship to counterbalance the dominance of traditional scholarship in China's universities and research institutions. As long as traditional historians safeguarded the particularity of Chinese history, Marxist historians stood together in favour of universalism. However, as soon as historians of the traditional kind had

¹³ Fan Wenlan, 'Lishi yanjiu zhong de jige wenti', *Beijing Daxue Xuebao*, 6 (1957), 6.

¹⁴ See Weigelin-Schwiedrzik, 'Back to the Past'; and Wang, 'Between Marxism and Nationalism'.

been expelled from their privileged positions, the situation changed. It was only then that Fan Wenlan and Wu Han realized that the dominance of Soviet scholarship would eventually eliminate the particularity and exclusivity of Chinese scholarship. That is why they wanted both: Chinese history as their point of reference, and Marxism-Leninism as a method that made the difference between them and those colleagues who just had to leave the field.

The only field of historiography in which Soviet scholarship was uncontested during the 1950s was that of world history.¹⁵ After the communist takeover this field was separated from Chinese history and given its own institution at the Academy of Science, its own programmes at the universities, and its own journal *Shijie lishi* [World History]. Zhou Yiliang, who was the most prominent historian of this field, published a two-volume study of world history, *Shiji tongshi*, in 1961, which complied to a high degree with the Soviet scholarship on the issue. However, under the pressure of the discussion on universalism and particularism that had been ongoing in the field of Chinese history since 1957, world historians started debating the problem of Eurocentrism. Zhou Gucheng, who had already published a multi-volume history of civilizations by 1949,¹⁶ was most outspoken in voicing his criticism of a Soviet version of Eurocentrism. Only ten years after the communist takeover, the idea that Chinese history could be integrated into world history by submitting it to the idea of society developing in five stages had thereby lost its overall authority.

GENERATIONAL CHANGE AMONG PRC HISTORIANS DURING THE 1960s

All this happened when Mao became more outspoken in his rejection of the Soviet model, and intellectuals in China felt safe to publish arguments in favour of the particularity of Chinese history. However, by the early 1960s the new generation of historians raised under the red banner of Mao Zedong was waiting for a chance to take over leadership. They realized earlier than the generation of intellectuals who had joined the communists during the Anti-Japanese War that Mao was heading towards a new theory of class struggle derived from what he observed as the danger of revisionism in the Soviet Union.

The discussion on 'historicism and class viewpoint' is closely linked to this question.¹⁷ It started in early 1960 and was aimed at defining the balance

¹⁵ See Leif Littrup, 'World History with Chinese Characteristics', *Culture and History*, 5 (1989), 39–64; Ralph Croizier, 'World History in the People's Republic of China', *Journal of World History*, 1:2 (1990), 151–69; and Susanne Weigelin-Schwiedrzik, *World History and Chinese History: 20th Century Chinese Historiography between Universality and Particularity* (Osaka, 2007).

¹⁶ Zhou Gucheng, *Shiji tongshi* (Shanghai, 1949).

¹⁷ Arif Dirlik, 'The Problems of Class Viewpoint versus Historicism in Chinese Historiography', *Modern China*, 3 (1977), 465–88.

between historical evidence and class analysis based on Marxist-Leninist concepts. One of the key problems consisted in assessing eminent persons in history. Should they be evaluated according to a class viewpoint informed by Marxism-Leninism and its view on what was progressive and what was reactionary? Or should the historian proceed according to criteria that were valid at the time the person lived and left his/her influence on history? Ning Ke, a professor of history at Beijing Normal University, famously argued in favour of a careful balance between what Wu Han had demanded as evaluation 'according to the then place and time' and class analysis.¹⁸ Nevertheless, Guan Feng, later to become one of the most prominent critics of anti-dogmatism, denounced Ning Ke's analysis as reactionary because of its lack of interest in class analysis.

Most of the prominent authors who voiced their anti-dogmatic opinions in the late 1950s and early 1960s also published articles concerning the teaching of history at schools in the PRC. In these articles they complained that the textbook image of the Chinese past was too negative. Instead, young people should be taught to be proud of their country because: 'In the history of our country, there were outstanding historical figures in each and every époque and in each and every dynasty. . . . Among them are emperors, kings, generals and ministers. We should be proud of the fact that these outstanding historical figures are there.'¹⁹ Ideas like these instigated discussions about other aspects of the past that had so far been rejected. The reassessment of Confucianism which had been repudiated for inhibiting China from entering modernity before the intrusion of the West by the majority of leftist intellectuals since the May Fourth Movement in 1919 was part of this wave of revisionism. In 1962, Zhou Yang, who was then deputy head of the propaganda department of the CCP's Central Committee, opened the floor for a positive view of Confucianism. Under his influence, Liu Jie put forward the idea that Chinese history was different from world history because Confucianism had prevented class struggle from developing in Chinese society.²⁰ Instead, as Jian Bozan and Wu Han explained, the policy of concessions was responsible for progress in Chinese history. As the ruling class knew how to make concessions because of the influence of Confucianism, peasants could ameliorate their living conditions without having to revert to overthrowing the system. The philosopher Feng Youlan and Wu Han even went so far as to argue that Confucianism had helped bring about a form of ethics that was placed above

¹⁸ Ning Ke, 'Lun lishi zhuyi yu jieji guandian', *Lishi Yanjiu*, 3 (1964), 1–38.

¹⁹ Jian Bozan, 'Muqian lishi jiaoxue zhong de jige wenti', in *Jian Bozan lishi lunwen xuanji* (Beijing, 1980), 32–47.

²⁰ Merle Goldman, 'The Role of History in Party Struggle 1962–4', *The China Quarterly*, 51 (1972), 500–19.

the interests of the ruling class and was therefore still valid in the present. They were immediately criticized for this argument.²¹

By 1964, what had looked like an open debate turned into yet another round of reshuffling the power structure of the field. Qi Benyu, almost unknown at that time, published an article in which he openly reproached Jian for attacking Marxism-Leninism and preparing the ground for eventually reintroducing traditional Chinese historiography in the form of the Qing dynasty style of evidential text criticism.²² Reconstructing the past on the basis of facts implied establishing continuity between past and present and thus relativizing the role of the revolution. With this article, Qi laid the foundation for the criticism with which all anti-dogmatist historians would eventually be confronted during the Cultural Revolution (1966–76). He reiterated the same arguments that had been used in 1957 to criticize traditional historians in order to get rid of the older generation of Marxist historians, and spearheaded this generational shift by going back to the master narrative that the CCP had put together before taking over mainland China. For this he would soon be backed by Mao Zedong, who vigorously demanded that determined people of a younger age should become the successors of the May Fourth generation. Yin Da, vice-director of the Institute for Ancient History and a member of this younger generation, responded immediately. He argued that: 'We need to bring the revolution of historiography to an end'—a phrase that would be highlighted as the title of his article²³—and a flood of publications followed his lead asking for everything that the anti-dogmatists had rejected a few years earlier: more class analysis, more theory, and more repudiation of the past. Even the renowned journal *Lishi Yanjiu* [Historical Studies], previously a stronghold against dogmatism, echoed the criticism, and many authors previously supportive of Fan Wenlan, Jian Bozan, and Wu Han saw the necessity of drawing a clear line between themselves and the anti-dogmatists.²⁴ However, their change of sides did not help them. Their articles were all criticized during the latter half of 1966, and the main representatives of anti-dogmatism were driven into isolation and desperation. Jian Bozan committed suicide in 1968,²⁵ and Wu Han died in prison as a consequence of maltreatment in 1969. Only Fan Wenlan survived the turmoil. He profited from Mao's personal protection, and died in 1969 shortly after he had been elected member of the ninth CCP Central Committee.

²¹ Chung Wah-ming, 'Criticism of Academic Theories in Communist China', in *Communist China 1966*, 2 vols. (Hong Kong, 1968); and Li Yun, 'Wo suo zhi de "san jia cun"', in Lu Lin, Wei Hua, and Wang Gang (eds.), *Zhongguo gongchandang lishi koushu shilü* (Jinan, 2002), 55–6.

²² Qi Benyu, Lin Jue, and Yan Changgui, 'Jian Bozan tongzhi de lishi guandian yingdang piban', *Hongqi*, 4 (1964), 19–30.

²³ Yin Da, 'Bixu ba shixue geming jinxing dao di', *Hongqi*, 3 (1966), 3–10.

²⁴ Ding Shouhe, 'Kexue shi wei zhenli er douzheng de shiye—Ji Li Shu xueshu shenghui', in *Li Shu shi nian ji* (Beijing, 1998), 119.

²⁵ See Ch. 3 by Antoon De Baets in this volume.

SOCIAL THEORY IN MAINLAND CHINA AND TAIWAN: THE WRITING OF HISTORY DURING THE 1960S AND 1970S

Maybe one of the reasons why the criticism of traditional Chinese historiography of the text evidential style did not come to a close in the PRC was the fact that Fu Sinian's form of source-oriented historiography dominated Chinese historiography on Taiwan up until the middle of the 1960s. The Academia Sinica Institute for History and Language which Fu Sinian had founded in 1928 was the centre of the so-called school of historical materials characterized by a form of history-writing that combined traditional Chinese historiography of the Qing period with a special understanding of Ranke which is often summarized in China as 'to write history the way it really was'. On this basis, the writing of Chinese history in Taiwan was not interested in developing a master narrative, but was focused on the critical edition of sources. Thus historians in Taiwan defined their difference from, and opposition to, the form of Marxist historiography which they called the 'school of interpretation' and which in their perception dominated the scene in mainland China.²⁶

By the mid-1960s, when the first generation of US-trained scholars came back to Taiwan, students began to express their dissatisfaction with this kind of source-oriented historiography. Scholars such as Xu Zhouyun and Tao Jinsheng introduced theories of social history through their newly founded journal *Si yu Yan* [Thought and Language]. As Xu Zhouyun would soon become professor at Taiwan National University, the history department at this university emerged as a stronghold for the new orientation of Chinese historiography in Taiwan. Tao Jinsheng, Du Weiyun, and Li Enhan joined forces to overcome the dominance of the 'school of historical materials'. At the time when Marxist historiography in the PRC was going back to its orientation of the early 1950s by repudiating a source-oriented form of history-writing, the writing of Chinese history in Taiwan was going through a similar process. In both cases the idea was to overcome the tradition of Qing evidential text criticism by introducing theories of social history of European origin. In both cases this shift in historiographical orientation was accompanied by a generational shift. However, historians in Taiwan embarked on this new orientation as part of a growing interest in social history that is generally characteristic of the Western world in the 1960s, and nourished by the idea of the universal applicability of these theories. In mainland China, renewed interest in Marxist theory was paradoxically part and parcel of a distancing from Marxist orthodoxy.

²⁶ See Wang, 'Taiwan's Search for National History'.

Qi Benyu's first step in this direction was an article on Li Xiucheng, one of the leaders of the Taiping Movement, who Qi reproached for betraying the revolt. This argument was part of a reappraisal of peasant uprisings and historical figures in Chinese history, and an explanation as to why the period of feudalism had lasted for so long in China. In contrast to what Jian Bozan and Wu Han had argued when they saw the concessions of the ruling elite as the motor of change in Chinese history, Qi Benyu argued in favour of peasant uprisings as the driving force in Chinese history. However, these uprisings never induced revolutionary change as their leadership betrayed the masses. It was Qi's intention to use the example of Li Xiucheng in order to hint at the possibility that traitors of the revolution could sabotage the revolution from the very heart of its leadership.²⁷ This idea was expressed years before the Cultural Revolution would be defined as a means of overcoming revisionism propelled by 'capitalist roaders' in the leadership of the CCP. No wonder that Mao pushed Qi into the editorial board of *Hongqi* [Red Flag], the then most authoritative theoretical journal of the CCP, and later on into the Cultural Revolution Small Group which replaced the leading party organs during the initial phase of the Cultural Revolution.²⁸

In his article on Li Xiucheng, Qi Benyu had done nothing but to reiterate an idea which Mao had already expressed in his article 'On the Chinese Revolution and the Communist Party of China' (see above). He had explained why Chinese history was not devoid of change as Hegel had stated. However, he also showed that fundamental change of the kind the French Revolution had brought to Europe was impossible in China. Not the bourgeoisie but the peasants were the driving force of history in China. This driving force was not revolutionary, as Marx had argued, and therefore needed the leadership of a truly revolutionary class. As the bourgeoisie was too weak for this leadership position, the necessary fundamental change could only be induced by the Communist Party. It is in this sense that Qi Benyu stuck to the master narrative of Yan'an times while adjusting it to Mao's new ideas about the bourgeoisie inside the Party.

During the latter half of the Cultural Revolution, after Lin Biao as the designated successor of Mao Zedong had been 'unmasked' as a traitor of the revolution, Chinese historians turned to the only undeniable fundamental system change in Chinese history in order to gain knowledge of the present situation. They used the unification of the Chinese Empire as an example for the contest between revolution and restoration that inevitably occurs after a fundamental system change. Interestingly, this implied that the theme of particularity, as well as the problem of change in Chinese history, surfaced again. Yang Rongguo, a professor of philosophy, invented a new model for the interpretation of Chinese history. He argued that the battle between Confucian and Legalist

²⁷ See Stephen Uhalley, 'The Controversy over Li Hsiu-ch'eng', *Journal of Asian Studies*, 25:4 (1966), 305-17.

²⁸ See Ding, 'Kexue shi wei zhenli er douzheng de shiye', 118.

factions among the ruling elite was the driving force of Chinese history. As Confucianists were the representatives of a slaveholder society, they were the restorative force. Their adversaries were the Legalists, with Qin Shihuang, the first emperor of China, who unified the empire and established a form of feudalism superior to the slaveholder society of previous dynasties as their most outstanding representative. However, when he died, the Confucian scholars succeeded in restoring their rule over China. The pattern of revolution and restoration which is identified with this historical period is one that runs throughout Chinese history. The 'two-line struggle' which had come to a climax during the Cultural Revolution was a sign of the persistence of this pattern. The narrative of history as the struggle between Confucianists and Legalists was the particular form in which the development in five stages became reality in Chinese history, and that is how the past was linked to the present and party history rewritten into the history of ten rounds of two-line-struggles, with Mao Zedong emerging as the omniscient and ever-winning party leader in opposition to left and right opportunism inside the CCP.²⁹

NEW DEVELOPMENTS IN HISTORIOGRAPHY SINCE THE LATE 1970S

In mainland China as well as in Taiwan, the political setting of the writing of history changed fundamentally when Chiang Kai-shek and Mao Zedong died. In Taiwan, already at the beginning of the 1970s, Taiwanese history emerged as an object of research,³⁰ though much of the initial research was done as part of investigations into regional aspects of Chinese history. The first cohort of young researchers with a focus on Taiwan were trained under the leadership of Zhang Guangzhou, Li Yiyuan, Wang Songxing, Guo Tingyi, and Li Guoqi. Among them, Chen Qinian soon gained a prominent position as he developed the idea of the Taiwan population distancing itself from the mainland earlier than previously thought during the nineteenth century. This idea was repudiated by Li Guoqi, who stressed that what actually occurred in Taiwan was a form of 'mailandization', meaning that Taiwan developed in much the same way as the adjacent mainland provinces such as Fujian and Zhejiang.³¹

²⁹ Yang Rongguo, *Zhongguo gudai sixiangshi* (Beijing, 1954); Yang Rongguo, 'Kongzi—wangude weihu nulizhi de sixiangjia', *Renmin ribao*, 7 August 1973; and see also Vivienne Teoh, 'The Reassessment of Confucius and the Relationships among Concepts, Language, and Class in Chinese Marxism 1947-1977: A Study in the Thought of Feng Youlan and Yang Rongguo on the Scope of Benevolence', *Modern China*, 2:3 (1985), 347-76.

³⁰ Leonard Cohen (ed.), *Taiwan: Studies in Chinese Local History* (New York, 1970).

³¹ Li Guoqi, *Qingdai Taiwan shehui de zhuanxin* (Taipei, 1978); and Wang, 'Taiwan's Search for National History'.

However, Chen's argument turned out to be more responsive to the ongoing political process in Taiwan, with the island becoming more and more isolated internationally, symbolized by the PRC taking over the representation of China in the UN and pushing for the so-called one China policy. This change in international relations forced the intellectual and political elites in Taiwan to redefine their identity and the identity of the population of Taiwan. The writing of Taiwan history has since then been part and parcel of this process.

Beginning in the early 1980s, Taiwan history attracted the attention of more and more young researchers and publications on the topic, and they have been growing in numbers. Institutions focused on Taiwanese history have been founded and conferences organized to propel the idea of Taiwanese history. Simultaneously, the above-mentioned criticism of the source and material-oriented form of historiography, which had dominated the scene for so many years, gained momentum. Topics related to local history and to socioeconomic problems became more and more attractive, replacing the political and institutional orientation of earlier periods. Additionally, traditional topics such as Taiwan during the Sino-Japanese War of 1895 or the reintegration of Taiwan into the Republic of China in 1945 became less important, with some historians explicitly rejecting the Sinocentric view.

While Taiwanization has taken the lead in nearly every aspect of cultural and political life and textbooks are being rewritten,³² the reorientation of historiography in Taiwan has so far not produced a generally accepted master narrative of Taiwanese history. In search of this master narrative, the idea of society and state in Taiwan being the result of a long-lasting process of colonization forms the basis of defining the particularity of Taiwanese history. This means that history is focused on the period of Hoklo and Hakka migration to Taiwan, on the Koxinga period after the founding of the Qing-dynasty, the Japanese colonization, and, finally, the domination of mainland China over Taiwan. As a consequence, the particularity of Taiwan is defined by its internationality as the result of long periods of foreign dominance. This version of a master narrative is highly contested, as it does not give enough space to the history of Taiwan's aborigines and because it suppresses Taiwan's relationship to the mainland.

Du Zhengsheng therefore proposes the idea of Taiwanese history in concentric circles, the centre of which is Taiwan surrounded by China and the world at large.³³ While his idea reconciles the argument of internationalization with the idea of Taiwan being integrated into a China-dominated East Asian culture, critics stress that Du's theory does not allow for due criticism of the Japanese occupation. Instead, Du praises the modernization that the Japanese occupation made possible, and overlooks the cruelty and oppression under which Taiwan

³² Peter Kang, 'Knowing whose Taiwan? Construction of the Chinese Identity in the High School History Education in Taiwan', *Hualian shiyuan xuebao*, 8 (1998), 217-36.

³³ Du Zhengsheng, *Taiwan xin, Taiwan hun* (Taipei, 1998).

had to suffer during fifty years of Japanese colonization. Simultaneously, Du tries to downgrade Taiwan's relationship to mainland China by arguing that Taiwan was independent of Qing China. Although this idea might be politically convincing, it conflicts with what is still a dominant concept among academic historians on Taiwan: the idea of historical truth.

With the end of the Mao era it was precisely the question of historical truth that stood at the centre of historiographical debates in the PRC. The master narrative that Cultural Revolution historians had tried to invent was put into question immediately after the dramatic change in the CCP leadership in 1976. However, the reason for the collapse of this master narrative was not related to the theoretical framework of Marxism-Leninism being put into doubt. It was a dramatic loss of confidence in the truthfulness of historical writing, generated by the fact that too many events from the past had been tabooed and too many facts 'distorted' in the political arena.

After the end of the Cultural Revolution the remembrance of the past was an essential part of the daily political routine as many rehabilitations were being carried out. Victims of the Cultural Revolution were fighting for their rights, and the evaluation of the seventeen years previous to 1965, as well as of the Cultural Revolution itself, was being undertaken. In this process, many so-called taboos of history were destroyed, up until then unknown historical facts made known to the public, the history of the CCP rewritten in many of its chapters, and the main events of nineteenth- and twentieth-century Chinese history reevaluated and reinterpreted.³⁴ However, while historians still believed in the 1980s that they could regain public confidence if they fulfilled their task as historians in a more appropriate way, by the 1990s they started to understand that the role of historiography in society was undergoing massive change. Even though history was still a topic of public concern, academic historiography was marginalized. New forms of history-writing were developed, and a group of historians started to enter the field who had not gone through proper academic training and who were not tied to the system of historiography as it had dominated the scene for so long. Authors of journalistic background such as Dai Qing, Ye Honglie, and others, started to compete with officially institutionalized academic historiography, showing that they could support themselves by writing what the public wanted to know about.³⁵

As a result, academic historiography was going through a crisis. While historians in universities and academies were still in search of historical principles, rules, and regularities, unofficial historians departed from this pattern and showed that history can be written as a story without theoretical 'guidance'. However, this way of writing history had long been regarded as belonging to the

³⁴ For an interesting overview, see Unger (ed.), *Using the Past to Serve the Present*.

³⁵ Geremie Barmé, 'Using the Past to Serve the Present: Dai Qing's Historiographical Dissent', *East Asian History*, 1 (1991), 141-81.

sphere of literature, and under the influence of the source orientation typical for traditional Chinese historiography, historians tended to downgrade the writing of history in the form of telling the story about the past as not complying with 'what really happened'. The younger historians no longer accepted this idea and started questioning the objectivity of historiography. Three different standpoints were discussed: the most extreme form of questioning objectivity argued in favour of a radical constructivism and subjectivism; the proponents of this idea were accused of relativism by members of the elder generation proposing instead to stick to the claim of objectivity in historiography while acknowledging the relativity and subjectivity of historical knowledge; the compromise between the two extremes was represented by the idea that historical knowledge is based on historical facts which objectively reflect what happened in the past. Thus historical facts are not constructed but 'given', and the creative process of writing history starts when the historian organizes historical facts into a narrative or into historical explanations. The process of writing history always reflects problems of the present, and in this sense its results are relative.³⁶

Under the influence of unofficial historiography, and as a result of gradually internationalizing the field, Chinese historiography has become a more diversified, open, and uncontrollable field. Quantitatively, the source-oriented version of history-writing is the most productive sector, as many historians engage in editing sources, dictionaries, and encyclopaedias, and in compiling sources of regional and local histories. Social history, gender history, economic history, and other fields of specialized historiography are gaining momentum. Whereas oral history was first introduced to circumvent the close control of the CCP and respective state organs on archives and sources, it is now often used to complement written sources, and to make use of memories accumulated among the part of the population that otherwise could not transmit its knowledge of the past. Especially when dealing with non-Han minorities, the combination of anthropology and history brings about important results. Simultaneously, historical understanding and consciousness among the younger generation is influenced by films, cartoons, and computer games which draw upon the reservoir of anecdotes from traditional Chinese historiography, and are often produced outside the PRC. Thus highly internationalized media disseminate a version of Chinese history that is globalized by its form and in particular by its content.³⁷

The never-ending debate on particularity and universality in Chinese history is ongoing. One of the issues where it tends to surface is the question of reform and revolution in Chinese history since the nineteenth century. As a consequence of

³⁶ Susanne Weigelin-Schwiedrzik, 'Die chinesische Historiographie in den 90er Jahren: Zwischen Erkenntnistheorie und Marktwirtschaft', in Hartmut Kaelble and Dietmar Rothermund (eds.), *Comparativ: Leipziger Beiträge zur Universalgeschichte und vergleichenden Geschichtsforschung*, vol. II (Leipzig, 2001), 53–79.

³⁷ Geremie Barmé, 'History for the Masses', in Unger, (ed.), *Using the Past to Serve the Present*, 260–86.

the CCP deciding on its policy of 'reform and opening' in 1978, historians came to think about whether or not 'only the revolution can save China'—the central idea of the earlier version of the CCP-invented master narrative—was still valid, with its harsh criticism of the Qing court, criticism of the Revolution of 1911, and the inability of the first Republican governments actually to change the situation in China for the better. Since 1978, many people in China have come to the conclusion that reform has brought about much more progress and success than all the revolutions China had gone through since 1911. This leads historians to compare the situation in China since 1978 with the situation of the late nineteenth century. In this context, the argument was put forward that revolution was particular to China in the twentieth century, and whoever questioned the necessity of revolution would rob China of its historical particularity. The hybridism of the political and economic situation in China thus generates a paradox for the writing of history: without particularity in history, the CCP's claim for 'a socialism with Chinese characteristics' would lack an historical foundation. However, if the idea of revolution is the very core of the particularity of modern Chinese history, the policy of reform and opening is devoid of historical precedence.³⁸

Another area where the discussion on the particularity of Chinese history is ongoing is the field of world history. Although organizationally still a field of its own, world history and Chinese history have recently overcome their mutual distance, and the debate as to the degree to which Chinese history can be world history is now much more explicit. Yu Pei, the vice president of the Institute for World History at the Chinese Academy for Social Sciences in Beijing, explains in a programmatic criticism of historiography in the PRC that the traditional cyclical view of history as reflected in dynastic histories is incompatible with the linear view that dominated Western historical writings. Also, the traditional way of writing history with China as the centre of the world can no longer be upheld. Thus both the writing of Chinese history and the writing of world history was changed into the logic of a linear view of history and of a world without China at its centre. The result is a form of Chinese history-writing in non-Chinese terms, and a world history without China at the centre. Up until today, says Yu Pei, this problem has not been solved, and China has lost its own way of looking at its own history.³⁹

³⁸ Cui Zhihai, 'Ping haiwai sanbu Liang Qichao sixiang yanjiu zhuanzhu', in *Qingnian xueshu luntan* (Beijing, 2000), 482–522; and Susanne Weigelin-Schwiedrzik, 'Recent PRC Scholarship on Liang Qichao and the Globalization of the Research on Modern Chinese History', in Martin J. Jandl and Kurt Greiner (eds.), *Science, Medicine and Culture: Festschrift for Friedrich Wallner* (Frankfurt, 2005), 176–98.

³⁹ Yu Pei, 'Dui dangdai zhongguo shixueshi yanjiu lilun tixi he huayu tixi de sikao', http://www.cass.net.cn/chinese/S22_slis/index/xueshujiangtan/xsjt_txt/20030627001.htm (accessed 16 June 2005).

Other historians in the field of world history stress the fact that the ongoing globalization process forces historians into treating the history of all nations as equal, thereby overcoming the idea that history has to be measured against the European model of development. At the same time they argue that in times of globalization the writing of global history has to relate the history of a nation to the region, and the history of a region to other regions of the world. Nevertheless, history itself is the history of fighting for dominance and power and a history of a continuous repositioning of centre and periphery.⁴⁰

The more recent controversy between global and world history is a controversy between the national and the transnational in the writing of history. While the idea of a Chinese version of world history reveals historians' claim for an alternative to the European and American way of looking at the world, the advocates of global history try to reinvent a Marxist approach in the Chinese context that is more akin to Chinese Marxism before sinification. It is the continuation of earlier attempts to focus on the universal rather than the particular, but similar to the world history approach insofar as it is rooted in a critique of Eurocentrism, and aimed at defining an alternative universality that could enter the competition with what is regarded as global history from a European and American point of view.

Post-1949 historiography on both sides of the Taiwan Strait has accompanied political change and the change in the international position of China. Simultaneously, it has actively taken part in this change, not only because the respective governments seek support from historiography, but also because historians on both sides of the strait explicitly embrace the duty of bestowing the nation with a national identity.

TIMELINE/KEY DATES

People's Republic of China

- 1949 Communist takeover; proclamation of Beijing as the capital of the People's Republic of China
- 1950–53 The CCP consolidates its rule
- 1956–7 The Hundred Flower Campaign
- 1957–61 As a consequence of the Great Leap Forward, the country is hit by a major famine
- 1966–76 The Cultural Revolution
- 1976 After Mao Zedong's death in September 1976, the 'Gang of Four' is expelled from the Party and Hua Guofeng is installed as Mao's successor

⁴⁰ Wang Lincong, 'Lüe lun quan qiu lishiguan', *Shixue lilun Yanjiu*, 3 (2002); also in http://www.cass.net.cn/xizafei/show/show_fruit.asp?id=568 (accessed 15 June 2005).

- 1978 The CCP decides on the policy of Reform and Opening and launches the 'Four Modernizations' of agriculture, industry, science and technology, and the military
- 1981 On 1 July the CCP Central Committee passes 'The Resolution on Some Questions Concerning the History of the Party since the Founding of the PRC' criticizing most of Mao's policies between 1949 and 1976
- 1989 Suppression of the protests in Tiananmen Square
- 1992 Deng Xiaoping's travel to the South is propagated by the media as the re-launch of the policy of reform and opening
- 1997 Hong Kong returns to the PRC, and exchange with Taiwan develops both in economic and intellectual terms
- 2004 Under the new leadership of Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao, the SARS crisis is overcome and the Party is forced to focus on questions of sustainability and social equity
- 2008 Summer Olympics in Beijing; protests in Lhasa and among Tibetans

Taiwan

- 1949 The Kuomintang government and military retreats to Taiwan; proclamation of Taipei as the seat of government of the Republic of China
- 1952 In the Treaty of San Francisco and Treaty of Taipei, Japan formally renounces all rights to Taiwan and Penghu
- 1953 During the Korean War Taiwan is proclaimed to be part of the US security zone in the Pacific Ocean
- 1955 The US and the ROC sign the Sino-American Mutual Defense Treaty and the Formosa Resolution to provide mutual military support
- 1960–70 Taiwan's Economic Miracle
- 1971 ROC loses its seat in the UN and the PRC takes over
- 1975 Death of Chiang Kai-shek; Chiang Chingkuo succeeds his father as leader of the Kuomintang and the state
- 1978 Chiang Ching-kuo is elected president of the ROC; re-elected in 1984
- 1979 The US passes the Taiwan Relations Act to redefine the relations to ROC; Formosa Incident sees many oppositional intellectuals condemned to prison terms
- 1986–7 Steps towards democratization taken
- 1988 After the death of Chiang Chingkuo, Lee Teng-hui succeeds him as the first native-born President
- 1996 Lee Teng-hui wins the first democratic President election
- 2000–7 The Name Rectification Campaigns for Taiwanese aborigines push the idea of Taiwanization which distances Taiwan from mainland China by emphasizing the uniqueness of Taiwan's language, culture, and history
- 2000 Chen Shui-bian wins the national election and succeeds Lee as the first elected President from the Democratic Progressive Party
- 2008 Ma Ying-jeou of the Kuomintang is elected president, ending the eight-year-presidency of Chen Shui-bian

KEY HISTORICAL SOURCES

- Bai Shouyi, *An Outline History of China* (Beijing, 1982).
 — *Zhongguo tongshi*, 12 vols. (Shanghai, 1989–99).
 Du Zhengsheng, *Taiwan xin, Taiwan hun* (Gaoxiong, 1998).
 — Wang Fansen (ed.), *Xin xueshu zhi lu: Zhongyang yanjiuyuan lishi yuyan yanjiusuo qishi zhounian jinian wenji*, 2 vols. (Taibei, 1998).
 Fan Wenlan, *Zhongguo tongshi dianbian*, 3 vols. (Beijing, 1953–65).
 — 'Lishi yanjiu zhong de ji ge wenti', *Beijing Daxue Xuebao*, 6 (1957), 1–10.
 Guo Moruo, *Zhongguo shigao*, 5 vols. (Beijing, 1976–83).
 Jian Bozan, 'Guanyu "shi" yu "lun" jiehe de wenti', *Guangming ribao*, 14 February 1962.
 Mao Zedong, 'Resolution on Some Questions of History', in *Selected Works of Mao Tse-Tung*, vol. 4 (New York, 1954–6), 171–85.
 — 'The Chinese Revolution and the Communist Party of China', in *Collected Works of Mao Zedong*, vol. 2 (Beijing, 1968), 305–34.
 — 'Zhunbei zuihou zainan', in Helmut Martin (ed.), *Mao Zedong Texte, Schriften, Dokumente, Reden, Gespräche*, vol. 3. (Munich, 1977).
 Ning Ke, 'Lun lishi zhuyi yu jieji guandian', *Lishi Yanjiu*, 3 (1964), 1–38.
 Qi Benyu, Lin Jue, and Yan Changgui, 'Jian Bozan tongzhi de lishi guandian yingdang pipan', *Hongqi*, 4 (1964), 19–30.
 Wu Han, *Xuexiji* (Beijing, 1980).
 Yin Da, 'Bixu ba shixue geming jinxing dao di', *Hongqi*, 3 (1966), 3–10.
 Yu Pei, 'Dui dangdai zhongguo shixueshi yanjiu lilun tixi he huayu tixi de sikao', http://www.cass.net.cn/chinese/S22_slis/index/xueshujiangtan/xsjt_txt/20030627001.htm.
 Zhou Gucheng, *Shijie tongshi*, 3 vols. (Shanghai, 1949).
 — and Wu Yuqin, *Shijie tongshi*, 4 vols. (Beijing, 1962).

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Anonymous, *Hu Shi sixiang pipan* (Beijing, 1955).
 Barmé, Geremie, 'Using the Past to Serve the Present: Dai Qing's Historiographical Dissent', *East Asian History*, 1 (1991), 141–81.
 — 'History for the Masses', in Jonathan Unger (ed.), *Using the Past to Serve the Present: Historiography and Politics in Contemporary China* (Armonk, 1993), 260–86.
 Chan Lien, 'Communism versus Pragmatism: The Criticism of Hu Shi's Philosophy', *Journal of Asian Studies*, 27 (1968), 551–71.
 Chung Wah-ming, *Communist China* (Hong Kong, 1968).
 Croizier, Ralph, 'World History in the People's Republic of China', *Journal of World History*, 1:2 (1990), 151–69.
 Cui Zhihai, 'Ping haiwai sanbu Liang Qichao sixiang yanjiu zhuanzhu', *Qingnian Xueshu Luntan* (2000), 482–522.
 Ding Shouhe, 'Kexue shi wei zhenli er douzheng de shiye—Ji Li Shu xueshu shenghui', in Li Shu (ed.), *Li Shu shi nian ji* (Beijing, 1998), 99–156.

- Dirlik, Arif, 'The Problems of Class Viewpoint versus Historicism in Chinese Historiography', *Modern China*, 3 (1977), 465–88.
 — *Revolution and History: The Origins of Marxist Historiography in China, 1919–1937* (Berkeley, 1978).
 Goldman, Merle, 'The Role of History in Party Struggle 1962–4', *The China Quarterly*, 51 (1972), 500–19.
 Gordon, Leonard H. D. (ed.), *Taiwan: Studies in Chinese Local History* (New York, 1970).
 Jian Bozan, 'Muqian lishi jiaoxue zhong de jige wenti', in *Jian Bozan lishi lunwen xuanji* (Beijing, 1980), 32–47.
 Kang, Peter, 'Knowing whose Taiwan? Construction of the Chinese Identity in the High School History Education in Taiwan', *Hualian shiyuan xuebao*, 8 (1998), 217–36.
 Leutner, Mechthild, *Geschichtsschreibung zwischen Politik und Wissenschaft: Zur Herausbildung der chinesischen marxistischen Geschichtswissenschaft in den 30er und 40er Jahren* (Wiesbaden, 1982).
 Li Guoqi, 'Qingdai Taiwan shehui de zhuanxing', *Zhonghua Xuebao*, 5:3 (1978), 131–59.
 — *Zhongguo lishi* (Taibei, 1990).
 Littrup, Leifin, 'World History with Chinese Characteristics', *Culture and History*, 5 (1988), 39–64.
 Teoh, Vivienne, 'The Reassessment of Confucius and the Relationships among Concepts, Language, and Class in Chinese Marxism 1947–1977: A Study in the Thought of Feng Youlan and Yang Rongguo on the Scope of Benevolence', *Modern China*, 2 (1985), 347–76.
 Uhalley, Stephen, 'The Controversy over Li Hsiu-ch'eng', *Journal of Asian Studies*, 25:4 (1966), 305–17.
 Wang Lincong, 'Lue lun quanqiu lishiguan', *Shixue lilun Yanjiu*, 3 (2002), 100–10.
 Wang, Q. Edward, 'Between Marxism and Nationalism: Chinese Historiography and the Soviet Influence, 1949–1963', *Journal of Contemporary China*, 9:23 (2000), 95–111.
 — 'Taiwan's Search for National History: A Trend in Historiography', *East Asian History*, 24 (2002), 93–116.
 Weigelin-Schwiedrzik, Susanne, 'Party Historiography', in Unger (ed.), *Using the Past to Serve the Present*, 164–71.
 — 'On "shi" and "lun": Towards a Typology of Historiography in the PRC', *History and Theory*, 35:4 (1996), 74–97.
 — 'Die chinesische Historiographie in den 90er Jahren: Zwischen Erkenntnistheorie und Marktwirtschaft', in Hartmund Kaelble and Dietmar Rothermund (eds.), *Comparativ: Leipziger Beiträge zur Universalgeschichte und vergleichenden Geschichtsforschung*, vol. 11. (Leipzig, 2001), 53–79.
 — 'History and Truth in Marxist Historiography', in Helwig Schmidt-Glintzer, Achim Mittag, and Jörn Rüsen (eds.), *Historical Truth, Historical Criticism and Ideology: Chinese Historiography and Historical Culture from a New Comparative Perspective* (Leiden, 2005), 421–64.
 — 'Recent PRC Scholarship on Liang Qichao and the Globalization of the Research on Modern Chinese History', in Martin Jandl and Kurt Greiner (eds.), *Science, Medicine and Culture: Festschrift for Friedrich Wallner* (Frankfurt, 2005), 176–98.

- 'Back to the Past: Revisionism in Chinese Communist Historiography', *Berliner China-Hefte*, 31 (2006), 3–22.
- 'World History and Chinese History: 20th Century Chinese Historiography between Universality and Particularity', in *Global History and Maritime Working and Discussion Paper Series* (Osaka, 2007).
- Yang Rongguo, *Zhongguo gudai sixiangshi* (Beijing, 1954).
- 'Kongzi—wangude weihu nulizhi de sixiangjia', *Renmin ribao*, 7 August 1973.
- Yun Li, 'Wo suo zhi de "San Jia Cun"', in Lu Lin, Wei Hua, and Wang Gang (eds.), *Zhongguo gongchandang lishi koushu shilu* (Jinan, 2002), 555–6.

Chapter 31

Japanese Historical Writing

Sebastian Conrad

POST-WAR RUPTURE AND NEW HEGEMONIES

In the autumn of 1945, Japanese historical writing started virtually anew. Or so it seemed: in the schools, instruction in Japanese history was halted by the American occupation authorities and only resumed one and a half years later when new textbooks were available. In the universities, the wartime orthodoxy of *kōkoku shikan*—a Japan-centred view of history focusing on the imperial house, on a Shintōistic moral codex, and on a vision of empire—lost its hegemonic grip on Japanese historians. Its main proponent, Hiraizumi Kiyoshi, resigned from Tokyo University, Japan's most prestigious institution of higher learning, and his colleagues joined him or were dismissed in the context of the occupation purges. But more than that: not only the forms of ultra-nationalist historiography bordering on propaganda dissolved almost instantaneously, but also the large majority of conservative historians seemingly lost their voice and interpretative authority. Instead, Marxist historiography, which had been suppressed before 1945, soon emerged as the most powerful strand of historical interpretation. From then onward, a Marxist-oriented social history would be the dominant paradigm of Japanese historiography. More powerfully even than in France and in Italy, Marxism shaped the intellectual climate in the early post-war period. Within a few years, even months, the landscape of academic historiography in Japan had changed dramatically.¹

At first glance this was a Kuhnian paradigm shift in its purest, not to say paradigmatic, form that found no parallel in other defeated nations, such as Italy and West Germany. But it had its own genealogy that was less internalist than Kuhn's model suggests. Marxism had already gained a foothold among Japanese intellectuals in the first years of the century, and in the 1920s it became

¹ For an overview on the early decades of Japanese historiography, see Tōyama Shigeki, *Sengo no rekishigaku to rekishi ishiki* (Tokyo, 1968); Nagahara Keiji, *Rekishigaku josetsu* (Tokyo, 1978); and Sebastian Conrad, *The Quest for the Lost Nation: Writing History in Post-War West Germany and Japan* (Berkeley, 2010).